What we are not is an equal partner to a sole superpower What we are not is an equal partner to a sole superpower – a comment on the “Special Relationship” by Will Parbury

Any serious vision of British foreign policy must contain an analysis of this most pivotal of relationships for the United Kingdom, so here’s mine.

My argument can be simply put before any exposition. British foreign policy has overrated the importance of the special relationship putting the strategic position of 1945 ahead of a hard headed analysis of British power and influence in the world, which is not inconsiderable.

Let’s establish some fundamentals. America is the sole remaining superpower. There are those who argue that American power is on a relative decline compared with the seeming exponential economic growth of China but it is clear that America is the greatest depository of military power the world has ever known. It has the world’s largest economy, its science is the most advanced on the globe and its culture stretches from continent to continent like no other.

Britain on the other hand can no longer be considered the hegemonic power it was at the end of the 19th and start of the 20th century. Two world wars presaged the disintegration of what was the world’s greatest ever empire. Now with the world’s fifth largest economy in the world, it has the most powerful armed forces in Europe; its economy has been successful in comparison with its European counterparts in recent years. It has a fine diplomatic service, a seat on the UN Security Council and the closest relationship of any country with the America in military and intelligence terms.

The special relationship was forged, not in the birth of the new American nation from its colonial mother but in the trials of war against the biggest threat ever posed to the free world: Nazi Germany. In 1940 Britain stood alone against this tyranny, its prospects looked bleak but America came to the aid of it’s fellow democracy and the war was won though the “blood, toil, tears and sweat.” of both nations working hand in glove to defeat the common foe. First in Europe and then the Pacific. It was during this time that sharing intelligence between the two nations become vital to the conduct of the war and joint work was started on the “Manhattan Project” which saw the Americans produce the world’s first nuclear weapons with some British assistance. In this time of conflict the bonds were forged.

The dream of British foreign policy in the post war era was to play a British Athens to the American Rome. Suez was when the British realized that this was a fiction that could no longer be sustained. The begging bowl that Keynes went with to Bretton Woods should have been an indicator that the economic game was up as far as our imperial ambitions went. Suez was the military realisation of this. In 1945 the empire was still intact. Indeed it had made a significant contribution to victory but it was not long to last. Over one short generation the greatest manifestation of the power of the British state its last remaining colonies achieved independence.
Europe had been shattered by the second war to devastate the continent in 50 years.

The system of relations between the states of Europe clearly had to change. A balance of power system that reached its apogee with the master statesman Bismarck, who’s Realpolitik could not be sustained by his less capable imitators, had to be ditched as the organising principle of international relations in Europe. Growing Soviet power won in its own “Great Patriotic War” in the east saw the continent divided. The remaining countries of Western Europe anxious to avoid war between themselves and provide protection against the threat of communism sought to more closely integrate with each other. It was not until 1973 in a state of post imperial enfeeblement that Britain became part of this endeavour.

These are the key background points to where we are today. There are two significant areas where the special relationship gives us an advantage. Firstly is access to intelligence. The cooperation that we are led to believe goes on in this field is extremely close. I think post Iraq we do have to put a question mark over the value of this intelligence relationship given the consequences of intelligence that at the very least was inadequate and at worst plain manipulated for political ends.

The second is over nuclear weapons. Where the “independent” nuclear deterrent is not quite a wholly US owned subsidiary though it gets pretty close on occasion. Should the US decide to withdraw support for the British nuclear deterrent a struggle to maintain the existing weapons that we have is about the limit of our capability unless we decide to shift very significant resources. There is also reality that we are unlikely ever to use these weapons which we acquire at great cost.

Quite what additional benefits we get from the special relationship are rather well hidden. The US military hasn’t invaded us yet but then they don’t really need to. Our relationship with the United States may be special to us but Uncle Sam is like the sailor with a girl in every port. The American Japanese relationship is very close. It may be something to do with the oil but Saudi Arabia is of key strategic importance to the US and woe betides any American politician who is not a strong supporter of the state of Israel. The thing is we have to realise that we are not the only one. Infidelity is going to hurt in any relationship but we have to get over it.

The reality is that we are a fairly large European based power. We may not like it in terms of our national identity, we may not like how the European project is run, we may not even have the same conception of what the union should be about as some, though not all, of our European partners. But it is an undeniable geopolitical reality that the logical course of action for British foreign policy is to play a significant role within the European project if we are seeking to maximise British influence. There is simply no other game in town.

Not only this, it would also be an abrogation from British history of the gravest nature. Britain may have traditionally positioned itself in “splendid isolation” but this has not stop use being involved with the wars of the continent. The problem with “splendid isolation” is not the idea of isolation itself but rather the international regime that it’s part of namely: balance of power. So what’s the problem with the balance of power? I would argue that it is a system of international organisation which makes war more likely rather than less. It is based on power rather than law or common value system. So the mindset that political leaders operate in is one where there goal is a zero sum power maximisation game.

Does this mean that we need to minimise other historical British foreign policy relationships, significantly the special relationship and the Commonwealth? No I would argue that we need to rethink the special relationship in more rational less emotional terms. We need to think from what we put in are we getting good value from what we get out of it. I am not convinced that we are at the moment so I would suggest that we need to reassess how we want to engage with the sole superpower.

We may want to start with reclaiming our foreign policy. We need to get away from the impression that British foreign policy is owned and decided lock, stock and barrel in Washington. The Commonwealth is never going to be the central plank of British foreign policy. It is a nice add on where we can hope to promote democracy and human rights but there will always be the taint of imperialism when we become involved with it.

Talking of values what about those of the special relationship? These English speaking liberal democracies with the shared cultural references. The history of common struggle, first against fascism, then communism and now against militant Islamist terrorists. I argue that these values do matter but changing the nature of the special relationship is not going to alter that fact. Perhaps this is what is truly special about the relationship that the vagaries of diplomacy will have relatively little impact on the shared culture and values. But neither should they have an undue influence on a hard head assessment of where our national interest lies.

In conclusion let me be clear. I am far from being anti American. I think America is in many ways a great country with a fine tradition of promoting freedom around the world. Certainly more so than other countries that had pretensions to global power namely the Soviet Union or more recently China. I also want the United Kingdom to have a strong relationship with the United States but this should not be at the cost of our foreign policy. We have to get back our sense of self respect. Europe offers us the prospect of improving our society through closer cooperation with the states most important to our own security. America offers us weapons technology, intelligence of patchy quality and great Prime Ministerial photo ops at the White House. Let us think harder about which relationship should be special to Britain.  ¶ 4:51 am